Founder-Centric CSOs: Accountability & Governance Challenges

The Governance Crisis Facing Bhutan's Civil Society 🌍

Civil society organisations (CSOs) are essential pillars of democratic societies, filling critical gaps in social and economic development where government resources may fall short. Yet across Bhutan, a troubling pattern has emerged: many of these vital institutions remain trapped in a cycle of founder-dominated leadership that raises serious questions about accountability, transparency, and long-term sustainability.

The phenomenon—often called "founder's syndrome"—occurs when an organisation's founding leader maintains excessive control long after their initial vision has been realised. Rather than evolving into professionally managed institutions with distributed leadership, some Bhutanese CSOs have inadvertently transformed into what critics describe as "family businesses," complete with succession patterns that favour personal connections over merit.

Understanding Founder's Syndrome in Bhutanese CSOs 💼

When CSOs first emerge, they typically spring from the passion and dedication of visionary individuals willing to invest personal resources, time, and sometimes years of unpaid labour to address community needs. This personal investment creates deep institutional roots and authentic mission alignment. However, when founders refuse to relinquish leadership roles, this strength becomes a vulnerability.

The structural problem is clear: without decentralised governance frameworks and enforced term limits, organisations dominated by their founders risk entrenching personal or family control. This concentration of authority creates cascading consequences that extend far beyond simple management inefficiency.

Transparency erodes as decision-making becomes opaque and personalised. Accountability mechanisms weaken when the person responsible for oversight is also the person being overseen. Public trust diminishes as citizens perceive CSOs as extensions of individual ambitions rather than genuine community institutions. Perhaps most critically, access to institutional funding becomes compromised—many donors and international partners now require evidence of professional governance structures and leadership succession planning.

The Succession Problem: Merit Lost in Translation 🔄

One of the most revealing indicators of founder-centric governance is how leadership transitions occur—or fail to occur. Across Bhutanese CSOs, observers have documented a troubling pattern: when founding Executive Directors (EDs) eventually step aside, their successors are frequently selected through informal processes rather than transparent, competitive recruitment.

In some documented cases, boards have engaged in "handpicking" successors, essentially pre-selecting individuals before any formal application process. Even more concerning, some succession arrangements have favoured family members or close personal contacts—reinforcing the perception that these organisations operate under nepotistic rather than meritocratic principles.

This approach creates institutional fragility. When leadership selection depends on personal relationships rather than qualifications, organisations lose access to the broader talent pool. New leaders may lack the professional experience or external perspectives necessary to guide the CSO through evolving challenges. The organisation becomes increasingly insular, resistant to change, and vulnerable to the departure of key individuals.

Regulatory Gaps: The CSO Act's Silent Shortcoming ⚖️

Bhutan's Civil Society Organisations Act 2022 (Amendment) represents a significant attempt to establish governance standards across the sector. However, the legislation contains a critical omission: it fails to specify mandatory term limits for CSO leaders.

Instead, the regulatory framework relies on internal governance arrangements, which vary dramatically across organisations. Some CSOs have established nine to ten-year maximum tenures, while others permit three-year terms renewable up to three times (effectively nine years), and still others allow five-year terms renewable for an additional five years (effectively ten years). This patchwork approach creates inconsistency and allows organisations to design term limits that conveniently accommodate their founding leaders.

More problematically, even where term limits exist on paper, not all CSOs enforce them consistently—particularly those with founding EDs who wield significant board influence. The absence of statutory requirements means enforcement depends entirely on individual board commitment and organisational culture.

The Accountability Void: Where Oversight Fails 🔍

The Civil Society Organisations Authority (CSOA), established as an autonomous government statutory body to oversee the sector, faces mounting criticism for its approach to CSO regulation. Rather than focusing on systemic governance issues and transparency mechanisms, observers contend that CSOA concentrates its efforts on micro-managing operational details.

This misalignment of regulatory priorities creates a dangerous accountability gap. While CSOA monitors compliance with administrative procedures, the fundamental governance challenges—founder entrenchment, nepotistic succession, concentrated authority—remain largely unaddressed.

One CSO board chairperson articulated the frustration bluntly: even when founding EDs have overstayed their relevance or had their positions rendered illegitimate by court decisions, they frequently continue operating without meaningful intervention. This suggests that neither the regulatory authority nor individual boards possess sufficient mechanisms or political will to enforce accountability.

Inside the Dilemma: Founder Perspectives 💭

It would be incomplete to address this issue without acknowledging the founder perspective. Many CSO founders genuinely believe their extended tenure serves organisational stability and mission fidelity. They argue that CSO leadership differs fundamentally from government or corporate positions, pointing to their willingness to work without compensation during formative years.

Kezang Tshomo, Executive Director of the Bhutan Toilet Organisation, articulated this viewpoint: CSOs emerge from founder passion and personal initiative in ways that government institutions do not. She noted that founders are typically willing to step aside if successors demonstrate equal passion and commitment—yet the challenge remains finding individuals willing to accept significantly lower compensation than comparable positions elsewhere.

This observation reveals an uncomfortable truth: CSO compensation structures often cannot compete with government or private sector salaries. While some CSO EDs earn over 150,000 Ngultrum monthly, others receive barely 50,000, frequently without allowances or benefits. Founders may resist succession partly because they recognise that successor motivation must be extraordinarily strong to justify the financial sacrifice.

Nedup Tshering, co-founder and ED of Clean Bhutan, exemplified this reality. He received no salary during the organisation's early years and began earning only after the Anti-Corruption Commission recommended compensation. His salary has remained unchanged since then, despite serving as ED for a decade and subsequently receiving a three-year extension.

The Distinction Between Tenure and Governance 📊

One nuanced perspective deserves careful consideration: lengthy tenure is not inherently a governance problem. An experienced, effective leader can provide valuable continuity, institutional knowledge, and strategic vision. The governance risk emerges specifically when extended tenure combines with weak checks and balances or when a leader operates the organisation as a personal fiefdom rather than a professional institution.

The critical factors determining whether long tenure strengthens or weakens governance include:

• Board independence and effectiveness: Does the board genuinely oversee the ED, or does it defer to founder authority?
• Transparent decision-making: Are decisions documented, explained, and subject to review?
• Financial accountability: Are funds managed according to established procedures, or do personal preferences override policy?
• Staff empowerment: Do other staff members have genuine authority and career development opportunities, or does the founder centralise all meaningful decisions?
• External accountability: Does the organisation welcome external audits, evaluations, and stakeholder feedback?

When these safeguards function effectively, even decades of leadership can serve organisations well. When they deteriorate, even five years becomes problematic.

The Public Perception Challenge 👥

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of founder-centric governance is reputational. When the public perceives CSOs as "family businesses" rather than genuine community institutions, support erodes. Donors become hesitant. Volunteers question whether their contributions genuinely serve community needs or primarily benefit founding families. Government partners may become reluctant to collaborate.

This perception problem extends even beyond organisations with obvious nepotism. Some CSO founders continue receiving benefits as advisers long after formally relinquishing ED positions—an arrangement that, while perhaps technically permissible, reinforces the appearance of ongoing personal enrichment.

Structural Solutions: What Effective Governance Requires ✅

Addressing founder-centric governance requires multi-layered intervention:

Legislative clarity: The CSO Act should establish mandatory, uniform term limits—perhaps two consecutive five-year terms—applicable to all organisations regardless of founder status.

Board empowerment: Boards must function as genuine oversight bodies rather than rubber-stamp entities. This requires board members with relevant expertise, clear conflicts-of-interest policies, and authority to make consequential decisions.

Transparent succession planning: Organisations should develop documented succession plans years in advance, conducted through competitive processes that welcome external candidates.

Regulatory refocus: CSOA should prioritise governance and accountability issues alongside administrative compliance, with authority to intervene when governance failures threaten organisational integrity.

Compensation review: The sector must address compensation disparities that make founder succession financially inaccessible to talented professionals.

Looking Forward: Evolution or Stagnation? 🚀

Bhutan's civil society sector stands at a crossroads. The organisations addressing education, health, environmental protection, and social welfare perform vital functions that complement government efforts. Yet many operate under governance structures that undermine their credibility and sustainability.

The challenge is not to eliminate founder leadership—many founders remain highly effective. Rather, it is to establish clear boundaries, enforce accountability mechanisms, and ensure that organisational longevity depends on institutional strength rather than individual indispensability.

As Bhutan's democracy matures and civil society's role expands, the sector must evolve from founder-centric models toward professionally managed institutions capable of sustained impact across generations. This transformation requires courage from founders willing to mentor successors, commitment from boards willing to exercise genuine oversight, and regulatory clarity from authorities willing to enforce accountability standards.

The question is not whether change will occur, but whether it will be proactive—guided by the sector's own commitment to good governance—or reactive, imposed by regulatory intervention or public loss of confidence. The answer will significantly shape Bhutan's civil society landscape for decades to come.